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Abstract 
This paper investigates microcredit as a strategy for overcoming constraints to saving, using 
data from the microfinance institution PRIDE Tanzania. My hypothesis is that many people 
join PRIDE because they are unable to save due to weakness of will, conflicting interests in 
the household or claims from extended family. This hypothesis is supported by publications 
that demonstrate that other financial tools have been used to overcome these constraints. My 
empirical investigation shows that a large share of PRIDE loans is spent on other purposes 
than income-generating activities, contrasting the conventional explanation of microcredit. 
Both quantitative data from surveys and qualitative responses from the in-depth interviews 
confirm that weakness of will, conflicting interests in the household and claims from extended 
family are real concerns, though only a small minority agree that these are the reasons why 
they borrow from PRIDE, rather than save.  Furthermore, both responses to survey questions 
and an experiment in the form of a lottery confirm and underline that women generally have 
less bargaining power in the household than men do. These findings give particular weight to 
the household allocation motive. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper I discuss microcredit as strategy for overcoming constraints to saving, using data 
from the microfinance institution PRIDE Tanzania. My hypothesis is that people join PRIDE 
because they are unable to save due to weakness of will, conflicting interests in the household 
or claims from extended family. I address these three explanations separately in the 
theoretical part, and focus specifically on the gender dimension in the empirical investigation. 
Using data that shows an uneven distribution of power in the household, I aim to demonstrate 
how microcredit can increase the bargaining power of women. I do not propose that 
overcoming saving constraints is the main motivation people have for joining PRIDE, but that 
it can supplement more conventional explanations. 
 
Microfinance, the provision of financial services to poor people, is an important topic in light 
of its position in the development discourse. According to Bateman (2010, pg. 1), 
microfinance has “(…) in just thirty years risen to become one of the most important policy 
and programme interventions in the international development community”. His point is 
underlined by Armendariz and Morduch (2010), who in the preface to the second edition of 
“The Economics of Microfinance” estimate that the number of microfinance clients has 
tripled from 67 to 200 million since their first edition five years earlier. But although scores of 
studies have been undertaken on the topic (ibid), there are still many disagreements and 
unanswered questions and microfinance has received both praise and criticism in recent years. 
There is anecdotal evidence of poor people who have benefitted greatly and lifted themselves 
out of poverty, but also of people being trapped in debt. Of the few large-scale randomized 
evaluations that have been undertaken, Banerjee et al. (2010) found that access to microcredit 
increased the investments among people identified as entrepreneurs, while people identified 
as having “a low propensity to start a business” on average increased their consumption 
through credit. The authors found no impact on measures of health, education, or women’s 
decision-making. With the growing realisation that microcredit is not a magic bullet, there has 
been an increased focus on other aspects of the financial lives of the poor (Collins et al., 2009, 
Rutherford, 2009). In recent years, the term “microfinance” has replaced the term 
“microcredit”, based on the recognition that financial needs of poor people go beyond loans to 
include services such as saving and insurance. 
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In writing this thesis, I have been affiliated with a research project at NHH Norwegian School 
of Economics on entrepreneurship and microfinance. The principal aim of this project was to 
analyse the impact of business grants and business training on microenterprise development 
through a field and lab experiment in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where microfinance clients 
from the institution PRIDE Tanzania made up the sample. The main result so far is that 
business training had a positive effect on the income of male entrepreneurs, but no significant 
effect on the income of female entrepreneurs. Business grants had no significant impact on 
the income of neither male nor female entrepreneurs (Berge et al., 2011). These somewhat 
surprising results lead the authors to suggest that human capital is a more binding constraint 
than financial capital, but that women face other constraints that prevent them from utilising 
this human capital. 
 
Furthermore, the common microfinance narrative is that of a poor person (usually woman) 
who receives credit that enables her to develop her business. As her business grows, she
1
 is 
able to both repay the loan and keep a profit for herself. High marginal returns to capital 
follows from the “diminishing returns principle” (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010): As poor 
people have little capital, a little more will have a large impact. However, the surveys show 
that borrowers spend on average around 60 percent of the loans on income-generating 
purposes. Of the business-related spending, stock (or inventory) makes up the largest share.  
This means that a large share of the loans is spent on other purposes, and the share spent on 
indivisible investments is modest. Borrowing from a an institution such as PRIDE carries a lot 
of costs in terms of a high interest rate, the time spent at meetings, and the risk of having to 
pay the loans of others through the system of joint liability. The findings that a large share of 
the loans is spent on other purposes than business, and cash transfers did not increase income, 
suggest that the narrative of capital constrained entrepreneurs does not tell the full story. 
 
The hypothesis I put forward in this paper is that overcoming constraints to saving is an 
important explanation for why people join PRIDE. An individual may wish to spend a lump 
sum of money on a specific purpose, but is unable to save because he is tempted to spend the 
savings on immediate consumption, because his spouse wishes to spend the money on other 
purposes, or because his extended family requests that the money is contributed to an 
                                                 
1
 I alternate between using “he” and “she”, more or less at random. 
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upcoming wedding. By financing this lump sum expenditure with a loan, repayment replaces 
saving, and his fellow members will enforce strict sanctions if he doesn’t follow through.  
 
My hypothesis is primarily based on findings from the literature that suggest that other 
financial instruments are used to overcome constraints to saving. These include Gugerty 
(2005) on ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit Association) participation as a 
precommitment strategy for overcoming present-biased preferences, Anderson and Baland 
(2002) on ROSCA participation as a strategy for women to improve their bargaining position 
in the household, and Baland et al. (2007) on participation in credit cooperatives as a strategy 
for individuals to give their kin the impression that they do not have savings. Furthermore, 
Collins et al. (2009) and Rutherford (2009) argue that although the poor use a range of 
different financial instruments, there are some basic needs all these instruments aim to fulfil. 
Rutherford also point out that the difference between saving and borrowing is not always 
clear cut, which suggest that the findings from ROSCAs can be relevant to microcredit as 
well. Based on this, and other papers presented in the literature review, I discuss weakness of 
will, conflicting interests in the household, and claims from extended family as three distinct 
constraints to saving. But although these three explanations have separate theoretical and 
empirical justifications, the individual may not necessarily distinguish clearly between them. 
Establishing whether saving constraints in general is a motivation for joining microfinance 
institutions is therefore a main aim. 
 
Section 2 provides a brief introduction to Tanzania, the MFI PRIDE Tanzania, and what has 
come out of the NHH research project so far. Section 3 presents a literature review of the 
three mechanisms: Present-biased preferences, conflicting interests in the household, and 
claims from extended family. In section 4, I argue why these mechanisms are applicable and 
relevant for PRIDE members. In section 5, I address this question further in the light of 
empirical findings from surveys and in-depth interviews. 
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2 The context 
This section briefly introduces the country, the organisation and the research project. 
2.1 Tanzania 
Tanzania is located in East Africa and had in 2008 a population of approximately 42.5 million 
inhabitants (UN data, 2011). Despite of an average annual GDP growth of 7 percent the last 
10 years (IMF, 2011), the country remains among some of the poorest in the world.  It is 
ranked as number 148 out of 169 countries on the Human Development Index, an index 
which includes life expectancy, literacy, and income (UNDP, 2011). The population is young, 
as 44 % of the population is 14 years or younger. The life expectancy at birth is 56.2 and 54.6 
for women and men respectively (UN data, 2011). 
 
As in many other developing countries, there is a lack of formal employment opportunities. 
Only 5 % of the population is employed in the industrial sector, while 75% of the population 
in employed in the agricultural sector (according to UN data (2011), 75% of the population 
live in rural areas). A large share of the population is therefore involved in the informal 
economy. Becker (2004, pg. 18) refers to results from a survey from 1991 that estimates that 
“34% of total households in mainland Tanzania are engaged in informal sector activities at 
any given point of time in the year. The proportion is much higher in urban areas with a peak 
of 55% of households in Dar es Salaam”. Informal activities are often combined with 
agriculture or formal employment. The leading business in the informal economy is, 
according to Becker, the sale of local beer, which “by itself provides employment to about 15 
percent of the total workforce”. In Dar es Salaam however, the leading business is selling 
cooked food. The informal sector employs more men than women, 28 and 15 percent of total 
employment respectively. 
 
As with formal employment, getting access to formal financial services can pose a challenge 
for Tanzanians. According to a comprehensive survey from 2007 (Financial Sector Deepening 
Trust), only 9 percent of the population has access to formal financial services (such as 
banks), and 54 percent has no access to even informal services. The numbers are striking, 
although one could debate precisely what it means to be excluded from informal services such 
as ROSCA's, as these are services a group of individuals could start together if they so 
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wished. In the urban population, 18 percent has access to formal financial services, and 
another 2 percent to microfinance institutions. People also use different kinds of services at 
the same time, 14 percent of bank account holders also save with an MFI, and 7 percent of 
bank account holders borrow from an MFI. 
2.2 PRIDE Tanzania 
PRIDE Tanzania is a Tanzanian microfinance institution, established in 1994, with 
headquarters in Arusha. PRIDE is an abbreviation of “Promotion of Rural Initiative and 
Development Enterprises”. The organisation currently serves 70 000, clients, in 48 branches 
across the country (Berge et al, 2011). Approximately 65% of the borrowers are women (MIX 
market, 2011). MIX market ranks PRIDE as the second largest organisation in Tanzania 
(based on numbers from 2009, the most recent), both in terms of gross loan portfolio and 
number of active borrowers. Interestingly, it is registered with a 0.00 % write-off rate (value 
of loans written-off / average gross loan portfolio), while scoring the highest level of 
transparency.  
 
The organisation describes the structure as a based on a modified Grameen model, targeting 
individuals who run microenterprises worth less than 700 US$ (PRIDE Tanzania, n.d.). The 
Grameen model entails a system of group lending with joint liability, where clients are 
required to meet at the PRIDE office for a one hour meeting and repayment every week. Each 
individual belongs to an “Enterprise group” (EG), consisting of 5 people, and a “Market 
Enterprise group” (MEC) consisting of 10 EG’s. The practice of joint liability means that 
each borrower is responsible for every loan being repaid in her EG, and ultimately for all the 
other members of the MEC (ibid.). In practice, the doors are locked when the weekly meeting 
starts and people are not allowed to leave until all payments have been made. This system of 
joint liability is designed to replace the need for collateral with peer pressure. 
 
The first PRIDE loan is worth 100 000 Tsh. Each time the loan is repaid, the client can access 
a larger loan, until she reaches the limit of 1 000 0000 (approximately 600 US$ at the time of 
writing). The interest rate charged is a flat rate of 30 percent (Henriksen & Svoldal, 2010). 
This entails that 30 percent of the initial loan is added as interest, after which the total is 
divided by 50 and repaid over the next 50 weeks. The annualised interest rate (APR) is 
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substantially higher. A consequence of the flat rate system is that the interest remains the 
same, even if the client repays the loan faster than scheduled. To get loans beyond the first 
cycle, the client must keep savings worth at least 25 percent the loan as insurance. PRIDE 
does not currently offer the clients the opportunity to deposit savings beyond the required 
savings. 
 
Each MEC elects a chairperson, treasurer and secretary, who are responsible for registering 
the payments and passing them on to the cashier in the PRIDE office. If a member exits an 
EG, it is the responsibility of this EG to find a new member. This member must then be 
approved by the MEC, which sends representatives to inspect the business premise. If a whole 
EG exits, the MEC is responsible for replacing it (Henriksen & Svoldal, 2010). PRIDE also 
offers a second loan product for entrepreneurs called the “Fahari loan” for clients who have 
successfully climbed the MEC loan ladder. The Fahari loan is an individual loan, and clients 
are required to present collateral. Clients also need recommendation from their respective 
MEC groups to advance.  
2.3 Introduction to the research project 
The project started in 2008 with a baseline survey of the respondents from the project’s 
partner, the microfinance institution (MFI) PRIDE Tanzania. Afterwards, the project offered a 
business course and a business grant to a randomized subset of the respondents, followed by a 
follow-up survey in 2009, lab experiments, and a second follow up in 2011.  
  
For the project, a sample of 644 PRIDE clients was selected from 2 branches in Dar es 
Salaam called Magomeni and Buguruni. Only clients at the second or third step of the loan 
ladder were considered, which means that they were eligible for loans of 500 000 and 
1 000 000 Tanzanian shillings (TSh) respectively. The reason for this was that the dropout 
rate among first time borrowers is higher. Approximately half the sample of 644 was then 
offered business training in a course consisting of 21 lectures of 45 minutes. The lectures had 
topics related to marketing, customer service, managing workers and business records, among 
others. The course was developed by the Entrepreneurship Centre at the University of Dar es 
Salaam (UDEC) and piloted extensively in advance. The course was then taught in Swahili by 
professionals from UDEC. In addition to the business course, a sample of both untrained and 
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untrained respondents received a business grant of 100 000 Tsh, which is approximately the 
equivalent of the cost of the training (Berge, et al., 2011). 
 
The results of the interventions was interestingly a 20-30 percent increase in profit from 
business training among male entrepreneurs, but no significant effect on female 
entrepreneurs. The business grant had no significant effect on business performance for men 
or women. The authors (Berge, et al., 2011) describe these findings as puzzling, and proceed 
to discuss possible explanations. The paper shows that in terms of business practices, training 
led to significant changes in the areas of employee relations, marketing and record keeping. 
Notably, male entrepreneurs became more prone to fire employees, while female became 
more likely to give bonuses. Furthermore, male entrepreneurs were better at marketing and 
expanding into commerce than female. However, this doesn’t tell us why training had 
different impacts on business practices for men and women. 
 
The paper proceeds by addressing internal constraints. An analysis of the mind-set of 
entrepreneurs, based on a lab experiment with incentivized questions and games, aimed to 
measure business knowledge, willingness to compete, confidence, risk preferences, time 
preferences and more. On business knowledge, the paper concludes that “the observed 
difference in impact from training on business practices and business performance cannot be 
explained by females not benefitting in business knowledge from the course” (Berge, et al., 
pg. 35). The training increased the confidence of female entrepreneurs and made male 
entrepreneurs more risk averse, thereby eliminating gender differences. “Time preferences” 
showed no significant gender difference or treatment effect. However, male entrepreneurs 
proved to have a significantly higher willingness to compete, with no effect from training. 
The authors argue that this difference in willingness to compete may be one important factor 
for explaining the different effects on men and women. 
 
The authors continue by discussing external constraints that are more binding to women than 
men. This includes household responsibilities. The surveys show that women work closer to 
home and on average 10 hours less each week. Furthermore, 79 percent of men knew their 
wives income in a normal month, while only 45 percent of the women. As the authors put it, 
“it seems reasonable to assume that domestic obligations and lack of influence over business 
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decisions make females less able to implement business knowledge from the training 
program” (ibid, pg. 38). The paper than concludes that:  
 
An important policy implication from our research is thus that more comprehensive 
measures are necessary in order to promote development among female entrepreneurs, 
paying greater attention to their motivation for joining microfinance and to the 
external constraints which may limit their ambitions (Berge et al., 2011, pg. 41). 
 
The part of the project where I have been involved was the 2011 survey, where I participated 
as an interviewer over a period of 6 weeks.  
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3 Literature review 
In this section, I present some of the literature on self-control, household conflicts, and claims 
from extended family that may make it difficult to save for the individual. 
3.1 Present-biased preferences and self control 
The most conventional model of intertemporal choice discounts utility exponentially. It is 
referred to as the discounted-utility model, and was created by Paul Samuelson in 1937 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue, 2002). On discrete form, it can be described as 
follows (Gugerty, 2005): 
 
   (            )  ∑ 
 
 
   
   
 
The discount factor,   =
 
   
  , where   is the discount rate. As  >0, 0>  >1. This exponential 
discounting model gives time-consistent intertemporal preferences (Rabin, 1998). This, in 
turn, implies that if an individual prefers 1000 shilling today, rather than 1500 in one month, 
he also prefers 1000 shilling in 12 months to 1500 shilling in 13 months. 
 
On the other hand, time-inconsistency or present-biased preferences "occurs when the best 
policy currently planned for some future period is no longer the best when that period arrives" 
(Cukierman, 1992, in Elster, 2000 pg. 24). I also use the term, “weakness of will”. It means 
giving in to the temptation of something that gives an immediate reward, although you know 
this is not the best decision in the long run. This concept is relevant in a discussion of saving 
and borrowing, because saving means making short run sacrifices for a long run gain.  
Although an individual may have the intentions of saving for a specific good, he may decide 
to spend his remaining income and tell himself he will start saving in the next period. People 
who keep telling themselves they will start a diet tomorrow are another example. The 
individual may be modelled as many separate agents at different points of time, with each 
agent aiming to maximize its utility (O'Donoghue &Rabin, 1999). 
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Although these are situations we can recognize from our daily lives, the concept contradicts 
an assumption commonly used among economist: that an individual’s preferences are 
consistent over time (Rabin, 1998). The alternative approach can be found in the field of 
behavioural economics, where scholars draw upon psychological research to criticise and 
supplement some of the conventional assumptions of human behaviour within economics. 
Rabin (2002, pg. 660), list a range of examples:  that “(…) people are Bayesian information 
processors; have well-defined and stable preferences; maximize their expected utility; 
exponentially discount future well-being; are self-interested, narrowly defined; have 
preferences over final outcomes, not changes; have only “instrumental”/functional taste for 
beliefs and information".  
 
Hyperbolic discounting is a way of describing time inconsistency. Elster (2000; 25) provides 
the intuitive explanation that “perhaps the central intuition behind this view is that individuals 
have a strong preference for the present compared to all future dates, but are much less 
concerned with the relative importance of future dates”. A common way of modelling 
hyperbolic discounting is the “quasi-hyperbolic” discount function introduced by Phelps and 
Pollack in 1968 (Gugerty, 2005): 
 
    
     ∑  
 
 
     
   
 
This model is also referred to as “β-δ preferences”. The difference between this model and the 
discounted utility model is the time-inconsistent parameter, β. β<1 implies that even if the 
discount factor δ=1, an individual will get more utility from period τ when it arrives than any 
previous period.   
 
Hyperbolic discounting can also be illustrated as in the figure below, presented in Elster 
(2000, pg. 30). At time 1, an individual is faced with the choice between a small reward at 
time 2 and a larger reward at time 3. The present value of choosing the larger reward at time 
3, represented with curve II, is larger than choosing the smaller reward at time 2, represented 
with curve I. However, at one point between time 1 and time 2, denoted t*, the present utility 
of choosing the smaller reward at time 2 becomes higher than waiting for the larger reward. 
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The possibility of a short-term gain becomes more important than the individual’s long term 
interest. 
 
 (Elster, 2000, pg. 30) 
 
Analogously to present-biased preferences, Elster (2000) discusses passion as a reason why 
people deviate from their original plans. Elster (2000, pg.7) defines ““passion” in an extended 
sense that covers not only emotions such as anger, fear, love, shame, and the like, but also 
states such as drunkenness, sexual desire, cravings for addictive drugs, pain, and other 
“visceral” feelings”. Being under the influence of alcohol, for instance, may change your 
preferences and behaviour. Elster further discusses four mechanisms: Passion may distort 
your beliefs about the consequences of an action; it may blur out the thoughts of 
consequences entirely; it may induce weakness of will, so that the individual knows he is 
acting against his better judgement but can’t stop himself; and it may change how the person 
weighs the consequences, such as immediate consequences versus future consequences. 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue (2002) further propose to use Kahneman’s (1994, in 
Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue, 2002) distinction between “experienced utility”, 
reflecting welfare, and decision utility, reflecting the attractiveness of options. Passion may 
increase the latter without affecting the former.  
 
When making the decision to save, an individual with present-biased preferences may have 
different beliefs on how his future self will choose between saving and consuming. At the one 
extreme, the naive individual believes the preferences of his future selves are identical to his 
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current preferences. At the other extreme, the sophisticated individual knows the preferences 
of his future selves (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). O'Donoghue and Rabin demonstrate that 
a present-biased individual, under certain conditions, will procrastinate in a situation with 
immediate costs, and preproperate in a situation with immediate rewards. They further show 
that sophisticates will procrastinate less than naifs. However, sophisticates may actually 
increase the preproperation, as they realise that waiting is no realistic option. However, 
O'Donoghue and Rabin point out that a middle ground between sophistication and naivety is 
more realistic. 
3.2 Precommitment 
An individual who realises that he will be tempted to deviate from his long-term plan may 
take steps to constrain his future options through precommitment. The most famous example 
of a precommitment strategy is perhaps the story from the Odyssey that Elster refers to in his 
title, “Ulysses unbound”. Ulysses knows that he will not be able to resist the song of the 
Sirens, and therefore ties himself to the mast and orders his crew to plug their ears with 
beeswax. A more contemporary example is “Freedom”, a computer programme that blocks 
your internet access: "Freedom frees you from distractions, allowing you time to write, 
analyze, code, or create. At the end of your offline period, Freedom allows you back on the 
internet. You can download Freedom immediately for 10 dollars, (…) (Freedom, n.d.)”.  
 
Alongside the anecdotal evidence, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) provide empirical evidence 
of the existence of precommitment strategies through an experiment involving students. The 
students had to hand in 3 compulsory essays by the end of the semester, but were allowed to 
set their own deadlines. Any delays would be penalised. It would be rational, in absence of 
self-control problems, to choose the last day of the term as deadline for all three essays. 
However, only 27 percent of the students chose this option. 
 
On the choice between an upcoming small reward and a larger reward in the future, Elster 
(2000, pg 31) outlines four different strategies to overcome hyperbolic discounting: “Making 
the choice of the early, smaller reward physically impossible (…); imposing a sufficiently 
large extra cost on the choice of the early reward (…); setting up a sufficiently large reward 
for the choice of the later reward (…); by the imposition of a mandatory and sufficiently long 
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delay between the time of the choice and the time at which the reward is made available to the 
agent (…).”  
 
More concretely, Laibson (1997) shows how "golden eggs", meaning illiquid assets, can be 
used as a precommitment strategy for saving. Laibson assumes a hyperbolic utility model, as 
above, with sophisticated agents. The agent prevents his future self from consuming savings 
by investing in illiquid assets. The model assumes, however, that it is impossible to borrow 
against these "golden eggs".  Financial innovation that reduces the illiquidity of assets 
therefore also reduces the savings rate. Furthermore, Laibson et al (2001) use the same 
framework to explain why so many Americans save for retirement and keep credit card debt 
at the same time. 
 
Gugerty (2005) proposes precommitment as an explanation of ROSCA participation, based on 
a study from western Kenya. “Saving requires self discipline, and ROSCAs provide a 
collective mechanism for individual self-control in the presence of time-inconsistent 
preferences and in the absence of alternative commitment technologies” (ibid, pg. 3). As 
above, individuals are assumed to have a quasi-hyperbolic utility function. Depending on the 
time inconsistent discount factor β, an individual may renege on his original decision to save 
in the next period. By joining a ROSCA, the person becomes committed to saving, with 
defaulting being the other option.   
 
Ashraf et al. (2009) designed a commitment savings product that was offered to a group of 
bank customers in the Philippines, through a randomized controlled trial. The product 
restricted access to savings until a certain time, or until the account had reached a certain 
amount. 28.4 percent of the bank customers who were offered this product (the treatment 
group) accepted it, and significantly increased their savings compared to the control group. 
3.3 Household conflicts 
An individual’s options may also be limited by external constraints, also within the 
household. Decision-making in the household is usually modelled in one of two ways: The 
unitary approach, which treats the family like a single agent, and the non-unitary approach, 
which models decision making as a bargaining game (Lundberg and Pollak, 2008). Gary 
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Becker is an influential proponent of the former approach. In his "A Treatise on the Family", 
Gary Becker assumes an altruistic head of the family (Pollak, 2003): "In my approach the 
'optimal reallocation' results from altruism and voluntary contributions, and the 'group 
preference function' is identical to that of the altruistic head, even when he does not have 
sovereign power" (Becker, 1981, in Sen, 1987. pg.15). Similarly, Paul Samuelson (1956, in 
Lundberg and Pollak, 2008, pg.1) models a household which "agree to maximize a social 
welfare function of their individual utilities, subject to a joint budget constraint that pools the 
income received by the two family members". What these two versions of the unitary 
approach have in common is that household conflict is basically assumed not to exist. 
 
In non-unitary models, the agents in the household have distinct preferences. These models 
can be divided into new categories, depending on the assumption of Pareto efficient outcomes 
and other distinctions. Amartya Sen (1987) presents a non-unitary approach to household 
conflicts with conflicting interests in the light of pervasive cooperative behaviour. He 
particularly discusses how a party's bargaining power is influenced by her welfare if 
cooperation breaks down, what her interests are perceived to be, and her perceived 
contributions, and by extension, claims, to the household. Sen further argues that the extent to 
which women are involved in income-earning activities affect both their breakdown positions 
and perceived claims. 
 
Lundberg and Pollak (2008, pg. 6) argue that empirical findings support a non-unitary 
approach:"A large number of recent empirical studies have rejected (the assumption of 
income) pooling, finding that earned and unearned income received by the husband or wife 
significantly affect demand patterns when total income or expenditure is held constant." One 
example is Duflo’s (2003) analysis of the expansion of the old age pension in South Africa 
after democratization. She found that girls in households with female pensioners (who 
became eligible after the expansion) increased their weight given height by 1.19 standard 
deviations and height given age by 1.16 standard deviations, reflecting improved nutritional 
status. Male pensioners in the household did not have any significant effect. Duflo (2003, pg. 
22) concludes that "the most important result of the paper may then be that this very large 
cash transfer had no effect if it was received by a man. This strongly rejects the unitary model 
of the household (...).” 
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Ashraf (2009) organised an experimental study of intra-household financial decisions in the 
Philippines by giving sums of money to married men and women. She found that men were 
more likely to keep the money if the wife didn't know about it, commit it to consumption if 
she knew about it, and give it to her if the couple were allowed to negotiate. For men to hand 
over their income to their wives who decide how to spend it expected in the cultural setting of 
the experiments, and it was mainly men from these households who wished to keep the 
money. However, women in those households where men controlled savings decisions 
behaved similarly to men in households where women made the decisions. Ashraf therefore 
argues that the effect depends on which gender controls savings decisions, not gender per se. 
As an example she refers to Kenya: "Kenya, a culture which has the opposite gender norms 
for financial management from the Philippines, many women form "secret savings societies" 
to keep extra income they earn in the workplace out of their husband's knowledge" (Ashraf 
2009, pg. 31). 
 
In a different paper by Ashraf et al. (2006), presented in 3.2 above, the authors found that 
women were more likely than men to accept the offer of a bank account with restricted access. 
The authors “put forth the idea that this is due to the Philippine tradition of women being 
responsible for household finances, and hence more in need of finding solutions to temptation 
or savings problems” (ibid. pg 668). 
 
Anderson and Baland (2002) put forward intrahousehold resource allocation as an explanation 
of ROSCA participation, using evidence from Kenya. By building a model of the household, 
the paper demonstrates that joining a ROSCA is an opportunity for women to protect savings 
from husbands who claim it for immediate consumption. One respondent summarised this as: 
“You cannot trust your husband. If you leave money at home, he will take it.” Furthermore, 
women’s bargaining position in the household follows ROSCA participation as an inverted-U. 
This means that women with little bargaining power may not be allowed to join a ROSCA, 
while women with much power don’t need too.  
3.4 Extended family and egalitarian norms 
In societies with strict egalitarian norms, an individual who wish to save may face demands 
from extended family or neighbours. (There are also many potential benefits from living in 
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egalitarian societies, but this debate is beyond the topic of my thesis). As a background for 
egalitarian norms, Platteau (2000) argues that reciprocal transfers can serve as mutual 
insurance in situations of persistent risk and uncertainty of income: 
 
The rationale of egalitarian norms that can be strongly enforced upon all community 
members follows from the following fact: individuals who have willingly entered into 
local networks of reciprocal transfers with a view of insuring themselves against 
various contingencies may choose to opt out whenever they have accumulated enough 
wealth after a series of good shocks to self-insure adequately (Platteau, 2000, pg. 198).  
 
In the context of mutual insurance, the community therefore has an incentive pursue 
egalitarian levels of wealth. In addition to preventing defection from successful members, 
Platteau (referring to Roger, 1969) argues that egalitarian norms stem from cultural views that 
attribute success to mere luck, which in turn makes sharing only fair. These demands will 
consequently constrain capital accumulation and business development. The egalitarian norms 
also make borrowers less obliged to repay loans from wealthier community members, which 
in turn make potential lenders less willing to offer credit. 
 
Platteau refers to egalitarian norms in traditional agrarian societies, defined as "tribal societies 
in which classes are absent and the only existing social differentiation is along sex and age 
lines" (ibid, pg. 189). He does however point out that egalitarian norms are not necessarily 
confined to the traditional agrarian societies from which they originate:  
 
(…) the negative effects of traditional norms of generosity and redistribution in terms 
of incentives to saving and innovation are not confined to the countryside but may also 
affect modern cities where many proprietors are unable to resist kinship demands  to 
any great extent, especially so in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Platteau, 2000, pg. 209) 
 
 
Fafchamps (1992) proposes a different narrative by focusing on patron-client relationships:  
 
The rich promise to help the poor in times of hardship and, in particular, to insure the 
poor against starvation. Since the rich have little to gain from a risk-pooling 
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arrangement with the poor, the poor have to reciprocate in some other ways.(...) The 
protection against starvation guaranteed by the patron's wealth significantly improves 
the expected utility of his client(s). Yet over time, transfers of labor help the rich get 
richer and may lead to the concentration of wealth in his hands” (Fafchamps, 1992, pg 
161) 
 
In this situation, poor people benefit from having a rich “patron” and would not wish to hold 
him back. Even though this line of thought is different from the egalitarian norms framework 
above, Platteau (2000) acknowledges that the two can coexist, especially when patrons 
emerge from traditional elites. 
 
Platteau's argument of egalitarian norms is supported by an interesting paper on funeral 
attendance in rural Zimbabwe. Barr and Stein (2008) use funeral attendance as a proxy for the 
diseased individual's status, and find that there is a negative relationship between income and 
status. This can be interpreted as a punishment from the community for violating an 
egalitarian norm. Barr and Stein further argue that the findings constitute strong evidence 
against the patron-client approach, summarised as follows: "The status-insurance hypothesis 
stated that there is a positive relationship between economic prosperity and status because the 
poor bestow status upon the rich in exchange for help in times of need" (ibid, pg. 16) 
 
The argument that egalitarian norms constrain capital accumulation finds support in a study of 
credit cooperatives in Cameroon (Baland et al. 2007). The starting point is that what the 
authors describe as “puzzling borrowing behaviour: more than 20 % of loans are fully 
collateralized by liquid saving available on the borrowers’ saving account” (ibid, pg. 2). 
Based on in-depth interviews, the authors argue that taking loans in these instances are signals 
to surroundings that the borrowers don’t have a lot of money.  Pretending to be poor can 
thereby help the borrowers avoid fulfilling traditional solidarity obligations. 
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4 Savings constraints and the poor 
We have seen examples above of how the institutional arrangements of different forms of 
saving and borrowing can help poor individuals overcome their own present-biased 
preferences or claims from others.  
4.1 Financial needs 
In Portfolios of the poor, Collins et al. (2009) show how intricate the financial practices of the 
poor can be. The authors used a method called financial diaries, where they followed 250 
households in three countries over a full year, interviewing them twice a month to track their 
cash flows. They found that poor people lead much more complex financial lives than both 
big economic surveys and small anthropological studies have been able to capture. Among the 
250 households, none used fewer than four types of financial instruments through the course 
of the year. The average number was 10 in Bangladesh, 8 in India and 10 in South Africa. The 
instruments are defined broadly, and include practices such as borrowing from neighbours, 
saving under the bed, and so on. 
 
The authors further define three different needs that drive the financial activity of poor 
households: 
 
1. Managing basics: cash flow management to transform irregular income flows into a 
dependable resource to meet daily needs. 
2. Coping with risk: dealing with the emergencies that can derail families with little in 
reserve. 
3. Raising lump-sums: seizing opportunities and paying for big-ticket expenses by 
accumulating usefully large sums of money (Collins et al., 2009, pg. 18). 
 
Focusing on raising lump-sums, Rutherford (2009) separates between life-cycle events, 
emergencies, and business opportunities. Life-cycle events are events that are costly, but that 
can be anticipated. Rutherford includes both events that happen through the course of a life 
time, such as weddings, child-births, home-building and funerals, and events that reoccur 
every year, such as religious festivals, payment of school fees, and fertilizer for agriculture. 
19 
 
Emergencies are in their nature both sudden and unanticipated, and can be divided between 
personal and impersonal emergencies. The former includes illness and loss of income, while 
the latter would include natural disasters. Business opportunities are possibilities to start or 
expand business or buy land or other productive assets. 
 
The various financial tools have different properties, and the poor people use a combination 
of several imperfect tools to cover the needs above as well as possible. An important 
distinction is between saving and borrowing. Collins et al. (2009) refers to loans as 
“accelerators” and saving tools as “accumulators”, while Rutherford (2009) uses the terms 
“saving down” for borrowing and “saving up” for traditional saving. Collins’ terms underline 
that borrowing means getting the lump sum immediately, while Rutherford’s terms underline 
that both practices are ways of raising lump sums. In fact, Rutherford (2009) argues that the 
distinction between saving and borrowing becomes blurry when loan cycles are short and 
repeated time after time: “In each case the client is using the service to swap a series of small 
regular pay-ins (or savings) for a usefully big pay-out” (ibid, pg. 21). To illustrate, Rutherford 
refers to case studies where he found it difficult to determine whether a person was a money 
lender or deposit collector.  
4.2 Overcoming savings constraints with savings 
clubs 
“Accumulators”, or tools for saving up, come in many different forms. Some of these tools 
are difficult to justify without taking weakness of will or claims from spouse or extended 
family into account. One example is the system of “moneyguarding”, which is when an 
individual keeps her savings with a relative, neighbour, employer, or someone else she trusts, 
to make sure the savings are not spent. Collins et al. (2009) argue that this system is more 
common than the literature suggests.  It is not unusual that two neighbours keep money for 
each other at the same time. Moneyguarding can clearly be described as a precommitment 
strategy, as having to go to the neighbour to ask for the savings adds a cost to immediate 
consumption.  
 
 A different example is “saving-up clubs”, which means that a group of people agree on a 
schedule for saving. The members of a saving-up club will meet, perhaps weekly or monthly, 
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with the amount previously agreed upon.  The money is usually pooled and kept in one place 
until the term ends. Then the pot is shared and a new cycle begins (ibid.). Joining such a club 
is clearly a commitment to future saving, and it prevents savings from being spent before the 
goal is reached. However, the other members will not be worse off if one member defaults 
(aside from a possible increased risk of more defaults and an unravelling of the club), which 
reduces their incentives to socially sanction the defaulter. The members also run the risk that 
the person holding the money may steal it. 
 
ROSCA’s are similar to saving-up clubs. However, in a ROSCA, each member will get the 
whole pot at every meeting, until everyone has received it. This means that everyone but the 
last one receives her lump sum sooner than if she saved on her own (Anderson et al., 2009). 
This motivation is however dismissed by Gugerty (2005) who propose an explanation based 
on self-control and Anderson and Baland (2002) who explain ROSCA participation as a 
strategy for women to keep savings from being spent by their husbands; both discussed 
above. A main difference from the saving-up club is that each individual would be tempted to 
stop contributing after she has received the pot. Anderson et al. (2009) demonstrates that 
ROSCAS are unsustainable in the absence of social sanctions.  Saving in ROSCAs therefore 
carries a certain risk. 
 
A more advanced version of the saving-up club is the ASCA (Accumulating Savings and 
Credit Association). In an ASCA, members are allowed to borrow from the accumulated 
savings by paying an interest rate (Collins et al., 2009). This means an increased pay-off at 
the end, but also a risk that the borrower may default. 
4.3 Overcoming savings constraints with 
microcredit 
We have seen examples of how an individual can use various kinds of savings clubs to 
overcome the savings constraints discussed in the literature review. Can microcredit be used 
the same way? Loans, or “accelerators”, have the obvious advantage of giving immediate 
access to cash, and usually the disadvantage of requiring interest. There are several reasons 
why an individual would choose to borrow rather than save, and people may have different 
combinations of motivations. If she can invest in a business that will increase her income to 
21 
 
the extent that she has money left when the interest is paid, she is better of borrowing than 
saving.  She may also expect a higher income in the future, and therefore borrow to smooth 
consumption over time. Loans may also be taken to pay for emergencies, or to have money 
available in case an emergency should one occur. If there are no safe place to keep savings, 
borrowing may be a way of reducing risk.  
 
But borrowing can also be a strategy to overcome challenges that are similar to those the 
saving-up clubs and ROSCAs addresses, namely weakness of will and claims from spouse 
and extended family. Collins et al. (2009, pg. 110) provide a good example with the story of a 
woman who negotiated a $20 loan with 15 percent monthly interest from a moneylender, 
while at the same time keeping $55 in a liquid savings account.  Her explanation was: 
"Because at this interest rate I know I will pay back the loan money very quickly. If I 
withdrew my savings it would take me a long time to rebuild the balance". This is in fact a 
precommitment strategy that adds an extra cost to consumption compared to 
saving/repayment, and may help her overcome present-biased preferences. 
 
In the case of the PRIDE loan, the client gets the loan in advance and pays it through the 
course of one year. The interest rate is a flat 30 percent. When a loan is taken, the whole MEC 
is jointly responsible, and the MEC can therefore enforce sanctions if a person defaults. The 
line of thought of the woman in the example above does not apply to PRIDE-members, as the 
total amount of interest remains the same whether the loan is repaid sooner than scheduled or 
not. But if a PRIDE-member takes a loan to buy any indivisible good he needs, the threat of 
sanctions will make him very likely to repay the loan. 
 
Let us assume that an individual wants to buy an indivisible good. However, each evening she 
gets more utility from consuming her daily earnings than saving them, alternatively that her 
husband or extended family claims it. She is therefore unable to save. Figure 1 illustrates this 
type of situation. By taking a loan, she can afford to pay for the indivisible good. After taking 
the loan, the choice each evening is not between saving and consumption, but between 
repayment and consumption with the consequences of not repaying. If the consequences are 
serious enough, she gets more utility from repayment than consumption. These consequences 
would also reduce the claims from her spouse and extended family, if they know about them 
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and care about her well-being. Paying interest and other inconveniences are the costs of using 
this “lump-sum generating instrument”.  
 
A question that remains is why this individual doesn’t choose an instrument to help her save 
instead, if we assume that the timing of when she receives the lump-sum is not important. 
Risk aversion is one possibility, as savings in ROSCAs and other forms of informal savings 
clubs may be stolen, while loans are handed out in advance. Savings clubs may also be less 
committing than taking a loan (Berge, n.d.). These questions will be revisited briefly in the in-
depth interviews. 
 
Present-biased preferences may in fact prevent an individual from leaving an MFI such as 
PRIDE. He may decide that he doesn’t need another loan, and would prefer to keep the 
money usually spent paying interest. However, when the last repayment is made and he is 
offered a new loan, he will be tempted to walk home with his pocket full. Rutherford (2009) 
gives examples of this from the original Grameen model in Bangladesh, which is similar to 
the PRIDE model. The loans were supposed to be for business development, and members 
offered increasing loans for each cycle. Many of the borrowers spent the loans on other 
purposes and benefitted from this. However, as they were offered larger loans, they were 
tempted to accept them. As the loans were not invested in income-generating activities, the 
household budget remained constant while the total amount of interest increased. This led to 
increasing repayment problems and default. 
 
The phenomena of weakness of will, claims from spouse, and claims from extended family 
have that in common that they all pose challenges to an individual who wish to save. But as 
we have examples of weakness of will from many times and societies, claims from spouse 
and extended family appear to be more dependent on other factors, such as poverty and 
tradition. The argument of claims from extended family is based on mutual insurance and 
egalitarian norms. Various forms of mutual insurance are clearly more important for people 
living in poverty with uncertain income and expenses. If the rural relatives of a given PRIDE-
member who experience that he is being excessively taxed by claims from extended family 
were given the opportunity of a safer and higher income, the claims would be reduced. The 
extended-family explanation is also based on a somewhat different mechanism, as it is, 
according to Baland et al. (2007), the signal effect that matters. 
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Similarly are there many variables that affect women’s position in the household. Although I 
have referred this constraint as “claims from spouse”, it is clearly women who are the 
marginalised party in most both households and societies. Sen (1987) argued that the 
bargaining power of each party in the household is influenced by his/her welfare if 
cooperation breaks down. As the husband in most cases has higher income and more physical 
strength, he has the power to drastically reduce the wife’s welfare. This is clearly not the full 
picture or even true in all circumstances. Social norms and traditions are also important. 
Furthermore, Anderson and Baland’s (2002) model of the ROSCA as a tool for increasing 
women’s bargaining power in the household predicts that women who are completely 
disenfranchised will not benefit from joining. This argument is just as relevant for PRIDE-
members. 
 
I have argued that overcoming three kinds of savings constraints is a plausible explanation 
why people decide to borrow from PRIDE Tanzania. However, the importance of these 
constraints compared to other types of motivation must be addressed empirically.  
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5 Empirical findings 
The aim of the empirical investigation is to address the question of to what extent joining 
PRIDE can be described as strategy for overcoming constraints to saving. These constraints 
include weakness of will and claims from spouses and relatives. It is not possible to find 
systematic differences between PRIDE-members and non-members, as our sample of 
respondents include only PRIDE-members. I therefore address these questions by examining 
the respondents’ behaviour, i.e. how they spend their loans and what savings instruments they 
use. The former tell us to what extent the loans are spent on income-generating purposes, as a 
high share spent on investment would be an argument against the savings constraints 
explanation. Moreover, if the saving practices show that the respondents do not have access to 
any instruments for saving; the actual savings constraint could be merely a lack of ways to 
keep money safe. I also have the respondents’ opinions of the different explanations, taken 
from the questionnaires of the 2011 survey, and the respondents’ views of saving and 
borrowing taken from in-depth interviews. The last section of empirical findings is an 
experiment that addresses the question of household dynamics. 
5.1 Data collection 
All data in this thesis were collected as a part of the research project on entrepreneurship and 
microfinance by the team from Norwegian school of Economics. All quantitative data are 
based on three surveys of a sample of PRIDE clients, undertaken in 2008, 2009, and 2011. 
The first dataset has 644 observations, the second has 530 and the third has 452
2
. I personally 
participated in the last survey as a research assistant. I also have qualitative data in the form of 
7 transcribed in-depth interviews that were undertaken in 2008.  
 
The survey interviews were for the most part undertaken in the client’s home or place of 
business, by either one or two interviewers. The interviewer(s) would read questions and fill 
in the questionnaire. The respondents were explained that the questions were asked for 
research purposes and that the interviewers were independent from PRIDE and would not 
pass on any personal information to them. But although the interviewers explained that they 
were independent, we cannot rule out the possibility that respondents answered certain 
                                                 
2
 The last survey had more than 452 observations, but the last ones were not available at the time of writing. 
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questions with answers they believed the interviewers or PRIDE wanted to hear, or that they 
themselves could benefit from in the future. This is perhaps particularly relevant for opinion 
questions, where there are no “correct answers”. Such challenges are documented by Karlan 
and Zinman (2007), who compared survey self reports with administrative data among 
recipients of high-interest consumer loans in South Africa. They found that 47% of the 
respondents failed to report that they had any formal sector loan. 
 
The respondents in the sample were randomly chosen among those who had reached at least 
500 000 Tsh on the loan ladder in 2008. This means that there has been selection process 
where those who didn’t find it beneficial to continue after the first year were not considered 
for the sample. 
 
Comparing PRIDE-members with non-members statistically is not possible, as the sample 
only includes members. The comparisons and regressions therefore focus on gender 
differences and the household conflict motive. However, by including excerpts and findings 
from in-depth interviews, we can also get an idea of the importance of the self-discipline 
motive and the extended family motive. They also give us an indication of the mind-sets of 
the entrepreneurs. The in-depth interviews were designed and undertaken by Lars Ivar Berge 
in 2008. The views expressed in these interviews are very similar to those I met in 
conversations with entrepreneurs. I have therefore decided to use the 2008 interviews, which 
are properly transcribed, instead of my personal notes from my own interviews. 
5.1.1 Regression analysis 
I have undertaken regressions to describe the gender difference on some of the topics below. I 
do not aim to formally prove causality, but merely describe the correlation between variables. 
All the dependent variables are binary, and I have therefore only used the probit model. I have 
also used the same control variables in most of the regressions: Years of education; age; 
whether the respondent is Muslim; PRIDE branch; whether the respondent received business 
training; number of children living in the house; and stated income from all businesses in 
2009. Education is included because it is generally accepted as a tool for female 
empowerment, and the female clients have on average slightly more years of schooling. Age 
is included to check for a generation gap in attitudes. It was furthermore important to control 
for religion, as there are more Muslim men than women in the sample. PRIDE branch is 
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included to check for any systematic difference between the two branches. Business training 
was also included on similar grounds. Children was included because the literature review 
show that women generally spend more than men on their children, and this may thus be a 
source of conflict in the household. Lastly, I control for income, though with two years of lag 
because of availability of data. I return to these regressions (included in the appendix) in 
sections 5.6 and 5.7. I have used the software Stata for all calculations. 
5.2 The PRIDE member 
The majority of PRIDE-members are women, and female clients make up 65.5 % of the 
original sample. More men (74.7%) than women (56.6%) in the sample are married and living 
with their spouse. In the 2011 survey, these figures have increased to 87.8 and 66.6% 
respectively. This suggests that many of the respondents have gotten married in this period, or 
that unmarried respondents are more mobile and therefore harder to track down. 
Table 1: Civil status by gender, 2011 
Civil status Female Male All 
Married, living with spouse 66,6 % 87,8 % 73,9 % 
Married, not living with spouse 1,0 % 0,6 % 0,9 % 
Divorced 9,1 % 2,6 % 6,9 % 
Co-habiting 2,4 % 2,6 % 2,4 % 
Partner, not co-habiting  1,4 % 1,9 % 1,5 % 
 No partner 6,8 % 3,2 % 5,5 % 
Widowed 11,5 % 1,3 % 8,0 % 
Other 1,4 % 0,0 % 0,9 % 
Total 100,0 % 100,0 % 100,0 % 
 
The table shows the civil status of the sample from the 2011 survey. We find that a larger 
percentage of women relative to men are either widowed or divorced. Unfortunately, we do 
not have the data to tell us whether this is because PRIDE attracts women who are divorced or 
widowed, or this happens after they have joined PRIDE. In fact, the starting point for 
Anderson and Baland’s hypothesis (2002) was an observation that an overwhelming majority 
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of ROSCA participants were women, and that married women were more than non-married 
likely to be participate.  
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the respondents, 2008 
 
 
Table 2 describes key statistics from the 2008 sample. Profit is the respondents’ own 
estimates of their monthly profit from all businesses. Sales are monthly sales. Employees 
refer only to paid workers. This can include family members, but not the spouse. Commerce, 
service, manufacturing and agriculture are the share of clients involved in each of these 
sectors. Age refers to the respondents’ age in 2008, and education refers to years of education. 
Muslim describes the share of Muslim respondents, as opposed to Christian. “Children” refers 
to the number of children who live with the client (not necessarily their own) and “Fin. Resp.” 
refers to the number of people the client has financial responsibility for. The two latter 
categories are from 2011. 
 
    Profit Sales Loan Commerce Service Manufacturing 
Women Mean 516341.3 2187640 772274.9 .6966825 .4407583 .1113744 
  S.d. 408782.3 3743246 238590.6 .4602368 .4970673 .3149686 
Men Mean 590393.6 3062518 766666.7 .7027027 .2567568 .2342342 
  S.d 498932 3405939 238522.3 .4581014 .4378313 .4244764 
All Mean 541868.7 2489228 770341.6 .6987578 .3773292 .1537267 
  S.d 442954.7 3651635 238396.4 .4591543 .4850951 .3609669 
 
            
 
 
   Agricult. Employees Age Education Muslim Children Fin. Resp. 
Women Mean .0545024 1.033175 37.92417 8.040284 .6255924  1.865385   3.752747 
  S.d. .2272757 1.680922 8.257376 2.162252 .484544  1.253539   1.748472 
Men Mean .036036 1.18018 37.3018 7.734234 .7297297  2.218274   4.558376 
  S.d .186801 1.52623 8.806307 2.035121 .445103  1.350764   1.967308 
All Mean .0481366 1.083851 37.70963 7.934783 .6614907  1.989305   4.035651 
  S.d .2142213 1.62956 8.448978 2.122699 .4735705  1.298306   1.866666 
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Men have somewhat higher sales and profit, and on average slightly more employees. As for 
religion, we find a notably larger share of Muslim among men than woman. We further note 
that a more or less equal share of men and women are involved in commerce, the largest 
sector. Typical examples of commerce are small kiosks selling drinks, snacks and phone 
vouchers, and markets stalls selling agricultural produce. However, the category includes 
everything from hawkers selling DVD’s on the street to businesspeople who import goods 
from China.   
 
Women outnumber men in services, partly because many female entrepreneurs have small 
restaurants or make and sell chapati on the street. Hair salons, repair shops and renting out 
rooms or three-wheeled taxis are other examples.  On the other hand, men outnumber women 
in manufacturing. Typical examples of manufacturing businesses are tailoring, making bricks 
or furniture. Very few of the respondents are involved in agriculture, as they live in urban 
areas. We also note that men have somewhat more children living with them, probably 
because more men are married, and that men report to have financial responsibility for more 
people than women do. 
 
The majority of PRIDE members in our sample are not best described as poor by Tanzanian 
standards. In a microfinance context, Hirschland (2005, pg. 4) defines the distinction between 
poor and non-poor as whether “current income is reliable and large enough to consistently 
cover minimum food, health care, and shelter.” We find that only 10 percent answer that they 
or their families have ever gone without enough food in the last year, and only 4.2 percent 
have gone without enough food more than once or twice. As for income, the median 
estimated monthly profit for the sample in May 2009 was 407212 Tanzanian shilling, while 
the average was 661499 Tsh. This would translate to US $285 and US $ 463 respectively, 
with the exchange rate of 0.0007 used in May 2009 (Oanda, 2011).  In comparison, the 
National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania (2002) reports that the mean household income in Dar 
es Salaam was 40767 Tsh per household member, while the national average was 17928 Tsh.  
 
We also have some information on the household dynamics from the 2011 survey. Notably, 
we find that 65.0 percent of married women (45.6 of all women) got financial support from 
their husband the previous month, while only 4.3 percent of married men (3.2 percent overall) 
got financial support from their wives in the same period. 
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Summarising the descriptive data on the PRIDE-members, we find that they have certain 
characteristics that suggest they may be vulnerable to the abovementioned constraints to 
saving. As the average respondent has a higher income than the average Tanzanian, he may be 
expected to support less fortunate members of the extended family. We also find that men 
have a higher income than women, and that married women are more likely than not to 
receive support from their spouses while men are hardly ever supported by their spouses. The 
latter suggest that it is common for husbands to share their income with their wives, who then 
take responsibility for the household. This gives the basis for conflicting preferences and 
uneven distribution of bargaining power in the household. 
5.3 Access to instruments for saving 
A possible explanation for why the PRIDE members choose borrowing instead of saving is 
that there are no safe places to keep savings. Rutherford (2009) illustrates with the example of 
deposit collectors in India, who people pay as much as 30 percent annual interest to keep their 
money safe. However, table 3 shows that the PRIDE members use a variety of saving devices. 
Note that the table shows the percentage of the sample that uses the mentioned saving 
instruments at the time of the survey in 2011, not the percentage of the sample that can access 
these when they want to. Note further that the different categories in this table are broader 
than the ones we find in Collins et al (2009). 
 
Table 3: Saving instruments (percentage of sample, 2011 
Saving instrument Women Men Total 
PRIDE 65,2 72,4 67,7 
Other microfinance institutions 4,7 1,3 3,1 
ROSCA 21,6 5,1 15,9 
ASCA 15,2 8,3 12,8 
Mobile phone savings 17,6 21,2 18,8 
Formal bank 65,2 57,1 62,4 
Relatives or business partners 33,8 41,7 36,5 
ROSCA and/or ASCA  33,5 13,5 26,6 
Any, except PRIDE 85,1 80,1 83,4 
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We also find that (not included in the table) more unmarried than married women keep a bank 
account (70.7 vs. 60.1%). Furthermore, the distinction between having “airtime”, meaning 
prepaid credit, and keeping savings on the cell phone is not clear. 15 % has 10 000 Tsh or 
more, while 10 % has 40 000 Tsh or more. 
 
Notably, 62.4 percent keep savings in a formal bank. This means that a safe and interest 
bearing form of saving is an option for most of the sample. When asked about the formal 
banks, some of the clients complained that these were not well suited for their daily needs. 
One member put it like this: “You know the nature of our business. We earn small profits; we 
can't take that to the bank. Also, I work from six to six, and the bank closes at four. When do 
you want me to go?” The last statement is interesting in light of the weekly compulsory 
meetings at the PRIDE office. We also find that 33.5 percent of all women also participate in 
a ROSCA or ASCA. The PRIDE category refers to the compulsory savings with PRIDE, 
which all respondents who are still members keep.  
 
We also notice that more men than women keep savings with relatives or business partners. 
Keeping savings with someone is in this context the same as lending to them. As the category 
includes both relatives and business partners, we cannot say whether this means that men send 
more money to extended families.  
5.4 Loan expenditure 
In the introduction I argued that the share of loans spent on business is an indicator of what 
motivates people to join PRIDE. The conventional justification for microcredit is that it 
should be spent on income-generating purposes that will make the previously capital-
constrained borrower able to both repay the loan with interests and keep a profit. As the loans 
are expensive, spending them on predictable expenses that don’t increase income, what 
Rutherford (2009) defines as “life-cycle” events, appear sub-optimal compared to financing 
these expenses through savings. The presence of constraints to saving could explain why a 
substantial share of the loans is spent on such purposes. However, we have to keep in mind 
that money is fungible. Savings originally intended for school fees may be spent when 
emergencies occur, and borrowing may be the only option left when the fees are due. Table 4 
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presents how the PRIDE clients in our sample use their loans. The figures are taken from the 
2009 survey, with 530 observations. 
Table 4: Loan expenditure, 2009 
Type of expenditure Average share of loan, percent Percentage of sample who spent 
parts of the loan on this purpose 
 Men Women Total Men Women Total 
Buying stocks (including replacement) 47,47 41,11 43,33 80,00 81,45 80,94 
Business investments- smaller investments 
like furniture, cooking equipment etc 
7,45 5,94 6,47 17,30 18,26 17,92 
Business investments - new premise 3,66 3,92 3,83 8,11 7,54 7,74 
Business investment – renovation 2,06 2,71 2,48 5,41 8,12 7,17 
Business investment – livestock 0,92 0,47 0,63 1,08 0,87 0,94 
Taxes / Public fees 0 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Other business expenditures 3,43 2,99 3,14 10,27 10,43 10,38 
Buying land / plot for housing 8,91 6,65 7,44 16,22 11,30 13,02 
Paying school fees 3,19 8,48 6,64 10,27 26,38 20,75 
Hospital/drugs 0,54 0,42 0,46 0,54 2,03 1,51 
Buying TV (for the home) 0,27 0,07 0,14 0,54 0,29 0,38 
Buying Furniture (for the home) 0,31 0,51 0,44 1,08 1,74 1,51 
Other household investments 3,76 7,15 5,97 9,73 16,52 14,15 
Contributions to extended family and friends 
(gifts or contributions to weddings, social and 
religious events, illness, funerals, etc) 
1,21 0,93 1,03 2,16 3,19 2,83 
Other household consumption 2,64 3,94 3,48 12,43 17,68 15,85 
Savings, putting aside for later usage 11,77 12,97 12,55 35,14 36,52 36,04 
Lending money to others 1,27 0,51 0,77 2,70 2,03 2,26 
Paying back loan to other 0,95 0,57 0,70 3,24 2,32 2,64 
Other, non-business 0 0,11 0,07 0,00 0,58 0,38 
Other business 0,19 0,32 0,27 0,54 0,87 0,75 
Cannot remember 0,02 0,23 0,15 0,54 0,58 0,57 
Total 100,02 100,00 100,00 217,30 248,70 237,74 
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When we add up all categories of business related expenditure, we find that the average share 
of loans spent on these purposes is 60.2 percent. 25.7 percent is spent on various household 
expenses, and 14.0 percent on saving or lending to others. We also find gender differences, in 
that men spend a slightly higher share of the loans on total business expenditure than women 
do, with 65.2 and 57.5 percent respectively.  Women, on the other hand spend more than men 
on other expenditures, with 28.5 against 21.0 percent. This is consistent with the household 
allocation motive, as this implies that women may have to borrow to make sure that the 
expenditures they find important can be paid for. 
 
It is interesting that stock (or inventory) makes up such a large share of the loan expenditure. 
As long as a business has enough stock to keep it running, one would assume that additional 
stock could be financed by income from previous sales. One possible explanation is that the 
borrower is starting a new business or significantly expanding an old one. In that case, she 
may need to pass a certain threshold before she has enough stock to start earning.  It may also 
be the case, however, that spending the income on additional stock is difficult because of the 
internal and external constraints to saving. Buying stock may also be a strategy to make 
savings less liquid, and therefore more difficult to spend. Only an average share of 16.8 
percent of the loans is spent on investment. 
 
School fees are expenses that can be anticipated. These “life-cycle events” do not increase the 
borrower’s income, and she would prima facie be better of financing these expenses by 
savings. School fees are also the expenditure with the largest gender difference, as women 
clearly spend much larger share of their loans on this purpose. We note from the table that 
more than one in four women spend some of the loans on school fees. This fits with the 
picture painted by Anderson and Baland (2002), who refer to several studies that find that 
women spend a larger share of their income on children than men do. Taking PRIDE loans 
could therefore be a strategy for women to make sure that they will be able to pay school fees.  
 
The share spent on contributions to extended family is marginal. This is not surprising: Both 
if there were no significant claims from extended family, and if there were claims and the 
respondent joined PRIDE to avoid them, would we expect the share of the loans spent on 
extended family to be small. 
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5.4.1 Timing of disbursements 
In the 2011 survey, we also asked whether the respondent would prefer to receive the loans in 
a specific month of the year, and if so, why. Comparing these findings with the loan 
expenditure table give us an indication of whether or not the loans are spent in accordance 
with their long run preferences.  
 
Table 5: Preferred month of loan disbursement 
Preferred month of 
disbursement 
Women 
count 
Women 
% 
Men 
count 
Men     
% 
Total 
count 
Total     
% 
January 33 23 % 12 12,8 % 45 19,1 % 
February 0 0 % 2 2,1 % 2 0,8 % 
March 5 4 % 3 3,2 % 8 3,4 % 
April 6 4 % 1 1,1 % 7 3,0 % 
May 3 2 % 9 9,6 % 12 5,1 % 
June 17 12 % 7 7,4 % 24 10,2 % 
July 13 9 % 6 6,4 % 19 8,1 % 
August 7 5 % 11 11,7 % 18 7,6 % 
September 6 4 % 2 2,1 % 8 3,4 % 
October 7 5 % 5 5,3 % 12 5,1 % 
November 4 3 % 2 2,1 % 6 2,5 % 
December 31 22 % 29 30,9 % 60 25,4 % 
Ramadan 6 4 % 2 2,1 % 8 3,4 % 
Month after R. 2 1 % 1 1,1 % 3 1,3 % 
Month before R.  2 1 % 2 2,1 % 4 1,7 % 
Total 142 100 % 94 100 % 236 100 % 
 
We found that 52.2 percent of the sample would, for various purposes, prefer to receive their 
loans in a specific month. Table 5 shows that December and January are the months most 
people wish to receive loans. In January, paying school fees is by far the most important 
reason. For December, the clients mention increasing stock before the holiday season, as well 
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as upcoming school fees in January. June, July and August are frequently mentioned as good 
months for business.  
 
While the loan expenditure table tells us how the loans are spent, this table tells us something 
about how the respondents wish to spend their loans. We find that around 10 percent of the 
entire sample would prefer to receive their loans in a specific month (January, June or 
December) to pay school fees. This is quite consistent with the findings from table 4, and 
suggests that this in fact was their motivation for joining PRIDE. For these borrowers, 
spending their loans on school fees is a planned decision, not because some emergency left 
them with no other options.  Among those who didn’t specify school fees as their reason for 
preferring loans in a specific month, almost everyone wish to spend their loans on stock. 
Some explain that the stock they need is less expensive at this time of the year, while other 
wish to expand the stock before the busy times of the year when demand increases. This share 
makes up about 40 percent of the total sample, near the average share of the loans spent on 
stock in table 4. 
5.5 Interviews 
The in-depth interviews undertaken by Lars-Ivar Berge in 2008 provide clear indications of 
the presence of constraints to saving. The respondents were asked a range of questions on 
saving and borrowing, and I will present and discuss excerpts of some the answers. Generally, 
all of the respondents support the existence of constraints to saving by stating that savings 
kept at home are easily spent on other purposes. It is not always clear, however, whether this 
is because the client is tempted to spend it himself, or because of claims from spouse or 
extended family.  
 
“Reginald”, a 42 year old man, explained the difference between saving at home and 
borrowing from PRIDE like this:  “There is a tendency of spending money/savings for 
activities not intended for while kept at home. I can say 75 percent of small entrepreneurs fall 
on this problem. (...) It is easy to achieve your goal in time when you borrow and pay back the 
loan, since one would have to work hard not to have assets confiscated." 
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“Ngasuma”, a 37 year old woman, has a similar answer to the question “why did you decide 
to borrow?”: “Because it is hard to save. Look here, whenever I pay back the loan I have 
savings of 1500 every week and it is not easy to go and draw it back any time because there is 
contract between PRIDE and the client. But it is opposite when I keep the money in my 
house; it is easy to draw it and buy something I want at any time even if I am aiming at 
reaching an important goal.”  
 
Furthermore, “Moses”, a 36 year old man says that: “It is very hard to save in our 
environments due to social problems surrounds human beings. For example, if I am to save 1 
Million for a certain period, I might be tempted to use part or the whole savings before I reach 
my goal whenever I am exposed to social problems. But it is easy to pay shillings 27,100 as 
loan instalments without noticing difference from the business and in this way after 50 weeks 
one would found he/she has unexpected savings.”  
 
The statements from Reginald, Ngasuma and Moses illustrate the presence of constraints to 
saving: Money kept at home will be spent, not saved. Borrowing is a way of making sure the 
long term goal is reached, although this is more expensive way of financing than saving is. 
Interestingly, both of the latter statements refer to repayment of loans as a form of saving. 
This is in line with Rutherford’s (2009) argument that the difference between saving and 
borrowing diminishes when the loan cycles are short and repeated several times. Reginald 
furthermore refers to a precommitment strategy when he says that one has to work hard not to 
have assets confiscated. By taking the loan, he adds an extra cost (confiscation of assets) to 
the option of consuming instead of saving.  
 
On a side note, “Beauty”, a 37 year old woman, illustrates that the short run “temptations” are 
not necessarily wasteful indulgences: “It is not easy to save money in the house; you will be 
tempted to use it when you face challenges like sickness and all that. As human beings you 
will face challenges like pregnancy, malaria and hunger that will force you to use it”.  
 
Related to the question of household bargaining, Ngasuma was asked whether she had heard 
of household quarrels caused by loans: “Aaa! Many. When household assets are confiscated 
where a woman takes a loan without informing her husband and failed to payback. Sometime 
it is when a woman saves her money at and her husband takes it for drink.”  
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Furthermore, Joseph (38) where asked whether women borrow for a specific reason: “Yes. In 
some household there is no trust between husband and wife that drives women to opt 
borrowing for her own expenditures like buying furniture, clothes, decorations, and 
sometimes to assist her relatives. This happened where a woman doesn’t have her own source 
of income and husband doesn’t have enough money to spend on woman’s preference.” 
 
Ngasuma’s outburst is very much in line with the question of household allocation discussed 
in the literature review. She gives the example of a wife that wishes to save and a husband 
who wishes to spend the money on something that gives him immediate satisfaction. Joseph 
provides more of a male perspective, and he refers to clothes and decorations as examples of 
how women want to spend their loans. The statements of Ngasuma and Joseph are clear 
indications of the presence of conflicting interests in the household. Especially the suggestion 
that some women take loans without their husbands’ knowledge supports the household 
conflict motive. 
 
As for the extended family motive, “Beauty” was asked whether pressure from relatives had 
any implications for her savings practices: “Relatives pressures are there always. I cannot 
refuse giving assistance to my relatives if they encounter problems even if is borrowed money 
as long as I have it at home.” When asked whether he would ever lend money from PRIDE to 
a relative, “Robert”, a 54 year old man, replies that: “No, loan is for business only. You know, 
when you go for loan you already plan what you are going to do so it is not easy for you to 
alter the plan.” It is not easy to interpret whether the difference between Beauty and Robert is 
due to having different relationships to relatives, or because the question to the latter 
emphasised that they were referring to money from PRIDE. Nevertheless, Beauty provides a 
good illustration of how claims from relatives may make it difficult to save. 
 
The respondents were also asked about ROSCAs as an alternative for raising lump sums. 
However, the respondents with experience with ROSCAs complain about the risks involved. 
Ngasuma says that: “ROSCA is a local form of savings and is very risky. In ROSCA there is 
no surprise to lose money just by being told somebody has disappeared with the money or has 
not paid or the money has been stolen. Therefore, we don’t fully rely on ROSCA (it is either 
lose or gain game).” 
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 “Samafilan”, a 41 year old woman, complained over the ROSCA she used to be a member 
of:” In ROSCA there is no formal contract and people are highly untreatable.” When asked 
why she wanted to join the ROSCA in the first place, she replied:  “To keep savings away 
from home. You know what; women are easily tempted to spend money for consumption so 
there is no way this savings is going to be safe if kept at home or in house.” Samafilan’s 
statement supports Gugerty’s (2005) hypothesis, which suggest that women join ROSCAs to 
keep money away from home. But both Ngasuma and Samafilan point to the risks involved 
when dealing with informal savings devices. Joining an MFI like PRIDE would both reduce 
the risk compared to a ROSCA and help the individual avoid keeping savings in the house, as 
I have argued above. 
 
A final point from the in-depth interviews is related to loan expenditure. We have seen above 
that a large share of the loans (43 percent on average) is spent on stock. “Robert”, a 36 year 
old male PRIDE-member, explains that “A good businessperson doesn’t make savings in 
terms of cash. Instead they keep stock. For example in harvesting period one would buy large 
stock of grain say rice at a low price and sell it in the post harvest period at higher price. 
Typical example is the price of rice, in a three months period the price has increased by 
shilling 350 per kg.” Robert thus point out that the timing of when stock is bought is not 
irrelevant, as well as that buying stock can both be a way of saving and a way of making 
money. 
 
The weakness of in-depth interviews is clearly that they are not necessarily representative for 
a larger population. However, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the presence of constraints 
to saving is a motivation for joining PRIDE, not necessarily the only or the most important 
motivation.  The in-depth interviews give clear indications of PRIDE being a solution for 
people who find it difficult to save because of their own weakness of will (“it is easy to draw 
it and buy something I want”), conflicting interests in the household (“(…) a woman saves her 
money at and her husband takes it for drink.”), or claims from extended family (“I cannot 
refuse giving assistance to my relatives (…)”).   
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5.6 Opinions from survey interviews 
Also answers from the survey interviews demonstrate that the presence of constraints to 
saving motivate PRIDE-members to borrow. The respondents were asked to evaluate 
potential reasons for why they chose to borrow instead of saving the last time they took a 
loan. The table shows how many agreed somewhat or strongly to the respective statements: 
Table 6: Opinions on saving, 2011 
 
The numbers tell us that self discipline and claims from spouse or relatives are a constraint to 
saving for a minority of the sample, and self discipline to a somewhat larger extent than the 
other two. The numbers are more likely to be underestimated than overestimated, as the 
statements puts respondents in a bad light, and moreover are inconsistent with PRIDE’s focus 
on business. But although the magnitudes of these figures underline that what is put forward 
in this thesis is a supplementary explanation, they still clearly demonstrate that savings 
constraints is a motivation for joining PRIDE for some people. It is also worth noting that the 
household allocation motive is seen as no more important than the two others. Although I 
present more evidence on the household allocation motive below, it doesn’t necessarily 
follow that this is a more central explanation than the other two. 
 
Moreover, we get more information on the household conflict motive by comparing men and 
women on the question of spouse’s expenditure. We find that women to a larger extent than 
men say their spouses will spend the savings. However, the difference is not significant at this 
sample size when controlling for other background variables (table A1). 
 
Gender differences were an important topic in the 2011 survey, in light of the previous result 
of women not benefitting from business training. The respondents were asked whether they 
agreed the most with statement A or statement B, and table7 shows the results. 
 Women Men Total 
I am not disciplined enough to save on my own  17.6 %                 17.9% 17.7% 
My spouse will spend the savings on other purposes if he/she knows I have it.  15.7 % 10.3% 13.8% 
I will have to spend all or some of the savings on my extended family if they 
know I have it. 
13.2% 
  
15.4% 13.9% 
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We find that most men and women agree that men join PRIDE with a clear ambition to grow 
their businesses, and that men invest in their businesses before they invest in their families. 
But while women answer that women behave similarly to men, men answer that women will 
prioritise their families. This difference between men and women is most obvious  when 
90.9% of the male respondents prefer “in a marriage, the husband typically makes all major 
investment decisions” to “in a marriage, the wife typically has the power to make major 
investment decisions “, while only 51.2% of women agree. These results are interesting. If we 
assume that the respondents use their personal experiences as the basis for decisions, the 
results may suggest that the female PRIDE-members have more decision-making power than 
the wives of male members. As Anderson and Baland (2002) proposed, women need to have 
a certain level of bargaining power to benefit from the ROSCA, our in our case, MFI.  
 
Table 7: Gender and business 
 
The results can also be partly explained by men and women having different definitions of 
business. The respondents were presented with a fictional story of Juma’s fruit juice business 
Statement Women Men Total 
A: Most females join PRIDE primarily to make ends meet, not to grow their 
businesses 22,0 % 41,0 % 28,5 % 
B: Most females join PRIDE with a clear ambition to grow their businesses   78,0 % 59,0 % 71,5 % 
A: Most males join PRIDE primarily to make ends meet, not to grow their 
businesses. 13,9 % 10,3 % 12,6 % 
B: Most males join PRIDE with a clear ambition to grow their businesses 86,1 % 89,7 % 87,4 % 
A: In a marriage, the husband typically makes all major investment decisions.  51,2 % 90,9 % 65,0 % 
B: In a marriage, the wife typically has the power to make major investment 
decisions  48,8 % 9,1 % 35,0 % 
A: A female with a loan will invest in her family before she invests in her 
business 14,2 % 31,4 % 20,1 % 
B: A female with a loan will invest in her business before she invests in her 
family 85,8 % 68,6 % 79,9 % 
A: A male with a loan will invest in his family before he invests in his business 11,5 % 8,3 % 10,4 % 
B: A male with a loan will invest in his business before he invests in his family 88,5 % 91,7 % 89,6 % 
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and asked whether or not a number of expenses should be considered business expenses. We 
find that 42.5% of the whole sample considered school fees for Juma’s daughter to be 
business expense. This includes 48.3 % of women and 31.4 % of men. The difference is 
significant, as shown in table A2. 
 
Moreover, the claim that men generally have a more dominant position in the household is 
supported by findings from the 2009 survey, which I have referred to above. In this survey 79 
percent of men reported that they knew their wives income in a normal month, while only 45 
percent of the women knew their husband’s income. The regression in table A3 demonstrates 
that the difference is highly significant, also when other background variables are controlled 
for. I have mentioned earlier that the majority of men support their spouses in a normal 
month, but only a very small minority of women do the same. If the husband and wife have 
different preferences in household, as the hypothesis predicts, the husband will have an 
incentive to keep any extra income and not tell his wife. Not knowing her husband’s income 
clearly reduces the wife’s bargaining power in the household.  
5.7 The lottery 
The questionnaire included a small experiment with the purpose of describing household 
dynamics. The client was informed that among the people interviewed, 5 people would be 
selected to win 100 000 Tsh (around 60 USD) through a lottery. Each client was also given 
the opportunity to name one person to be given a “ticket”, and thereby the same chance of 
winning as him or herself. This ticket could not be transferred, however. Both the client and 
the named second person would be contacted by phone if one of them were to win.  
 
If we view the household a single unit, we would assume that every client named her spouse 
to double the household’s chance of winning. On the other hand, if the husband and wife have 
conflicting interests, this is no longer as straightforward. If one of them wins, both will know. 
If the client is the party in the household that has the power to control the money no matter 
who wins, he or she would sensibly choose the spouse. If the client will not be able to control 
the money, he or she would be more likely to choose someone else. In this way, the lottery 
experiment will show who has the bargaining power in the household. The respondents have 
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no reason to lie, as may sometimes be the case with direct questions where the respondents 
fear losing face. 
 
Table 8: Choice of recipient in lottery, 2011 
Recipient # Women   % Women # Men  % Men 
Spouse 60 36,59 % 66 56,41 % 
Parent 1 0,61 % 1 0,85 % 
Sibling 21 12,80 % 6 5,13 % 
Friend 13 7,93 % 11 9,40 % 
Business partner 1 0,61 % 3 2,56 % 
Child 53 32,32 % 15 12,82 % 
Relative 13 7,93 % 9 7,69 % 
Other 2 1,22 % 6 5,13 % 
 Total 164 100,00 % 117 100,00 % 
 
This table shows the results for married women and men. Interestingly, we find large 
differences between men and women. Men choose their wives 56.4 % of the times, while 
women choose their husbands only 36.6 % of the times. Women are almost just as likely to 
choose a child as her spouse, and also more likely to choose a sibling 
 
The regression A4 tells us that the difference between men and women in choosing their 
spouse is significant, also when controlling for the usual right-hand side variables. The result 
that women are much less likely to name their spouses gives a clear indication of females 
having less bargaining power in the household. This is in line with the argument I have made 
above, and supports the hypothesis that women use PRIDE as a tool to ensure that they are 
able to finance lump-expenses they find important.  The loan expenditure table tells us that 
school fees are such an expense. If the woman would have been unable to pay for school fees 
without borrowing, because the husband wants to spend the money otherwise, then being a 
PRIDE member implicitly improves the woman’s bargaining power in the household.  
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In table A5, I replace the dependent variable with a dummy that shows whether the married 
respondent chose a child, and the picture changes somewhat. The control variables age and 
profit are both significant and positive. We find that men are less likely to choose a child for 
the second ticket, but also that the older the respondent is, and the higher income he has, the 
more likely he is to choose a child. This is probably because the age of the respondent is 
correlated to the age of their children, and that there are disadvantages associated with naming 
a young child. It could possibly also be seen as an intergenerational transfer in the context of 
marriage or other life-cycle needs, and that the mother is more eager to do so than the father. 
The alternative intergenerational transfer explanation is probably also supported by the 
positive effect from income. The higher income the PRIDE-member has, the more she can 
afford to give away. 
 
When we shift to sibling as a dependent variable (table A6), the effect of age becomes 
negative, which may suggest that those who are unwilling to share with their spouses may 
choose a sibling if the children are too young. We also note that the gender is no longer 
significant on conventional levels. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have made the argument that overcoming constraints to saving can supplement 
conventional explanations for why people wish to borrow from microfinance institutions. I 
have presented three different kinds of constraints to saving from the literature: Present-biased 
preferences, conflicting interests in the household, and claims from extended family. The 
literature shows how these constraints can be overcome with different financial tools. Based 
on the approaches of Collins et al. (2009) and Rutherford (2009), I have argued that 
microcredit can be seen as such a tool. 
 
I have also presented empirical data that support my hypothesis, with quantitative data from 
surveys of PRIDE-members in 2008, 2009 and 2011, and qualitative data from in-depth 
interviews from 2008 and 2011. The respondents report that a large share of the loans is spent 
on other purposes than business, contrary to the intentions of PRIDE. Notably, many women 
use parts of their loans paying their children’s school fees, in accordance with the explanation 
of conflicting interests in the household. 
 
The in-depth interviews also give strong indications of the presence of constraints to saving. 
The respondents say that savings kept at home will be spent on other purposes than intended, 
and give examples of all three abovementioned explanations. Although in-depth interviews 
cannot be claimed to be representative for a larger sample, their responses show that these 
constraints do exist. Furthermore, the in-depth interviews complement the quantitative data by 
explaining how these are concerns in the daily lives of the respondents. 
 
The 2011 survey also contained questions where the respondents were asked to evaluate 
statements related to the savings constraints. 17.7% agreed partly or fully that they borrow 
because present-biased preferences make it difficult to save, 13.8% that conflicting interests 
in the household make it difficult to save, and 13.9% that claims from extended family make 
it difficult to save. These figures confirm that these constraints are real, although the 
magnitudes show that this is not the main reason why people borrow. More married women 
than married men agree that their spouses will spend their savings, although the difference is 
not significant at this sample size and when controlling for other relevant background 
variables. However, the finding that men are much more likely than women to know their 
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spouse’s income gives a strong indication that women have less bargaining power in the 
household. 
 
The lottery experiment from the 2011 survey underlines the same finding on household 
bargaining power. The result that married men are much more likely than married women to 
choose their spouses in the lottery demonstrate that men have a much greater saying when 
deciding how the family’s income will be spent. Women choose their siblings and children to 
a much greater extent, which suggest women have more influence over them than their 
husbands. The lottery experiment is interesting because the respondents don’t have to justify 
their choices, and “actions speak louder than words”. 
 
Because of the nature of available data, the empirical investigation has focused on the 
household allocation motive. Data on loan expenditure, in-depth interviews, questions from 
the surveys and the lottery experiment tell more or less the same story. Women are generally 
in the weaker position in the household, this makes it difficult to save for some women, and 
borrowing from PRIDE is then a way of making sure that school fees and other expenses are 
paid for. It is not the only reason why women join PRIDE, but it is still significant and 
relevant. The explanations of weakness of will and claims from extended family have not 
been addressed as thoroughly, but both the in-depth interviews and survey questions indicate 
that both are important. 
 
Although it has been known for a long time that the poor have financial needs beyond credit, 
and that borrowers of microcredit spend their money on many other purposes than business, 
credit has remained the central component of microfinance. But the mood is changing, and 
there’s a growing recognition that microfinance institutions have to give more focus to 
savings and other services (Microfinance Gateway, n.d.). If the new savings products are 
designed in a way that properly addresses these constraints to saving, paying school fees 
would be a lot less expensive to many women.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: “My spouse will spend the savings”  
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        333 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =       7.83 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.4506 
Log likelihood = -110.15311                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0343 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
spousespen~r |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |  -.2121111   .1991013    -1.07   0.287    -.6023424    .1781202 
        educ |  -.0352963   .0429603    -0.82   0.411    -.1194968    .0489043 
       age11 |   .0037467   .0114118     0.33   0.743      -.01862    .0261135 
      muslna |   .0156224   .2049268     0.08   0.939    -.3860267    .4172715 
    buguruni |   .1856173   .1905338     0.97   0.330    -.1878221    .5590567 
      dtreat |   .2340198   .1908515     1.23   0.220    -.1400422    .6080818 
childrenlive |   .0084837   .0748499     0.11   0.910    -.1382195    .1551868 
    profit09 |  -2.89e-07   1.84e-07    -1.58   0.115    -6.49e-07    7.07e-08 
       _cons |  -1.141575   .7193253    -1.59   0.113    -2.551427    .2682763 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
The dependent variable spousespen~r is a dummy which takes the value 1 for the outcome 
“somewhat or strongly agree” to “my spouse will spend the savings on other purposes if 
he/she knows I have it”. Only observations from married respondents are included, as the 
question is refers specifically to the spouse of the respondent. The variables included are 
gender (male); years of education (educ); age (age11); whether the respondent is Muslim 
(muslna); PRIDE branch (buguruni); whether the respondent received business training 
(dtreat); number of children living in the house (childrenlive); and stated income from all 
businesses in 2009 (profit09). 
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Table A2: “School fees is a business expense” 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        452 
                                                  LR chi2(3)      =      18.58 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0003 
Log likelihood =  -298.8767                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0302 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
schoolfees~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |  -.4547638    .131556    -3.46   0.001    -.7126088   -.1969187 
 marriedlive |   .1471399   .1398106     1.05   0.293     -.126884    .4211637 
      dtreat |  -.2768468    .120337    -2.30   0.021     -.512703   -.0409905 
       _cons |  -.0081215   .1317408    -0.06   0.951    -.2663288    .2500858 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The dependent variable schoolfees~a is a dummy that takes the value 1 for considering school 
fees to be a business expense. The right hand side variables are gender (male); being married 
(marriedlive); and business training (dtreat).  
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Table A3: “I know my spouse’s income” 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        296 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =      31.58 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log likelihood = -184.79252                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0787 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     spinc09 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |    .835621   .1634207     5.11   0.000     .5153223     1.15592 
        educ |  -.0222483   .0360536    -0.62   0.537     -.092912    .0484155 
         age |  -.0007989    .009417    -0.08   0.932    -.0192558     .017658 
    buguruni |    .100848   .1562274     0.65   0.519    -.2053521    .4070482 
      muslna |   .1584368   .1629486     0.97   0.331    -.1609367    .4778102 
 
      dtreat |  -.1156637   .1542164    -0.75   0.453    -.4179223    .1865949 
  child71509 |  -.0788326   .0766223    -1.03   0.304    -.2290095    .0713443 
    profit09 |  -1.00e-07   1.13e-07    -0.89   0.376    -3.22e-07    1.22e-07 
       _cons |   .1866939   .5585401     0.33   0.738    -.9080247    1.281412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The dependent variable spinc09 is a dummy that takes the value 1 for knowing the spouse’s 
income. Only married respondents are included. The right hand side variables are gender 
(male); years of education (educ); age (age); PRIDE branch (buguruni); whether the 
respondent is Muslim (muslna); number of children between 7 and 15 (child71509); whether 
the respondent received business training (dtreat); and stated income from all businesses in 
2009 (profit09). The dependent variable is from 2009, and some of the right-hand side 
variables are therefore slightly different. 
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Table A4: Spouse chosen as lottery recipient 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        325 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =      14.43 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0713 
Log likelihood = -215.94815                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0323 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lottspouse~w |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |   .4752007   .1478705     3.21   0.001     .1853799    .7650215 
        educ |   .0123146   .0329314     0.37   0.708    -.0522297    .0768589 
       age11 |  -.0084417   .0087783    -0.96   0.336    -.0256468    .0087634 
      muslna |  -.0425843   .1533141    -0.28   0.781    -.3430744    .2579058 
    buguruni |   .1041942   .1428284     0.73   0.466    -.1757442    .3841327 
      dtreat |  -.2139537   .1434174    -1.49   0.136    -.4950467    .0671393 
childrenlive |   .0658948   .0562194     1.17   0.241    -.0442932    .1760828 
    profit09 |  -3.63e-08   1.06e-07    -0.34   0.733    -2.44e-07    1.72e-07 
       _cons |   -.124934   .5350281    -0.23   0.815     -1.17357    .9237018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The dependent variable lottspouse~w is a dummy that takes the value 1 for choosing the 
spouse in the lottery. Only married respondents are included. The right hand side variables 
are gender (male); years of education (educ); age (age11); PRIDE branch (buguruni); 
whether the respondent is Muslim (muslna); whether the respondent received business 
training (dtreat); number of children living in the house (childrenlive); and stated income 
from all businesses in 2009 (profit09). 
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Table A5: Child chosen as lottery recipient 
 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        325 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =      50.45 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -158.35383                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1374 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
lottchildnew |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |  -.8301728   .1824003    -4.55   0.000    -1.187671   -.4726747 
        educ |   .0306541   .0367277     0.83   0.404    -.0413308     .102639 
       age11 |   .0521697   .0105384     4.95   0.000     .0315149    .0728245 
      muslna |   .1553055   .1780168     0.87   0.383    -.1936011    .5042121 
    buguruni |  -.0945208   .1629364    -0.58   0.562    -.4138702    .2248286 
      dtreat |   .2485887   .1662229     1.50   0.135    -.0772022    .5743797 
childrenlive |  -.0271762    .063338    -0.43   0.668    -.1513164     .096964 
    profit09 |   3.22e-07   1.27e-07     2.54   0.011     7.35e-08    5.70e-07 
       _cons |  -3.177752   .6604782    -4.81   0.000    -4.472265   -1.883239 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The dependent variable lottchildnew is a dummy that takes the value 1 for choosing a child 
in the lottery. Only married respondents are included. The right hand side variables are 
gender (male); years of education (educ); age (age11); PRIDE branch (buguruni); whether 
the respondent is Muslim (muslna); number of children living in the house (childrenlive); 
whether the respondent received business training (dtreat) and stated income from all 
businesses in 2009 (profit09). 
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Table A6: Sibling chosen as lottery recipient 
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        325 
                                                  LR chi2(7)      =      19.91 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0058 
Log likelihood = -94.591902                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0952 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  lottsibnew |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |  -.3882873   .2259221    -1.72   0.086    -.8310864    .0545118 
        educ |  -.0156936   .0511982    -0.31   0.759    -.1160403     .084653 
       age11 |  -.0521183   .0156312    -3.33   0.001    -.0827548   -.0214817 
      muslna |  -.3115527   .2090951    -1.49   0.136    -.7213716    .0982661 
    buguruni |   .0259354   .2065199     0.13   0.900    -.3788362    .4307071 
      dtreat |   .1734952   .2064189     0.84   0.401    -.2310783    .5780688 
childrenlive |  -.0634313   .0863074    -0.73   0.462    -.2325906     .105728 
       _cons |   1.265017   .8246228     1.53   0.125    -.3512141    2.881248 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The dependent variable lottsibnew is a dummy that takes the value 1 for choosing a sibling 
in the lottery. Only married respondents are included. The right hand side variables are 
gender (male); years of education (educ); age (age11); PRIDE branch (buguruni); whether 
the respondent is Muslim (muslna); number of children living in the house (childrenlive); and 
whether the respondent received business training (dtreat). 
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